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Abstract:  
In cases where many causes together bring about an effect, it is common to select some as 
particularly important. Philosophers since Mill have been pessimistic about analyzing this 
reasoning due its variability and the multifarious causal and pragmatic details of how it 
works. I argue Mill was right to think these details matter, but wrong that they preclude 
philosophical analysis of causal selection. I show that analyzing the pragmatic details of 
scientific debates about the important causes of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy can illuminate 
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Why are some causes judged to be more important than others? Do some causes have 
features that make them more important? Or are these judgments unfounded? In cases where 
many causes together bring about an effect, it is common to select some as particularly 
important and background the others. Causal selection is used regularly in scientific and 
everyday reasoning. Yet, philosophers tend to respond to it with either pessimism or retreat. 
Many doubt its merit as a philosophically interesting form of reasoning, or simply ignore it in 
favor of more general notions of causality. The variability in how causes are selected and the 
diverse pragmatic details about different rules, reasons, and purposes involved in selecting 
important causes across different contexts leads many to these dismissive conclusions. 
I argue that embracing the pragmatics of causal selection, something most 
philosophers avoid, is key to understanding how this reasoning works. Ignoring these details 
leaves important cases of causal selection intractable. While the reasoning behind causal 
selection does indeed vary, there are principled and philosophically interesting ways to 
analyze the pragmatics of causal selection. I show this by analyzing safety scientists’ 
reasoning about the important causes of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, the deadliest industrial 
disaster in history. 
Before proceeding, it is important to distinguish two senses of “causal selection.” 
Philosophers of science typically conceive causal selection in terms of distinctions among 
many causal factors. They analyze how scientists reason about important causes in cases 
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with many causal factors. For example, C. Kenneth Waters (2007) examines why genetic 
causes are more important than non-genetic causes for explanatory reasoning in biology. 
Philosophers of causation working in an analytic tradition are interested in a different sense 
of selecting causes. They analyze distinctions made between genuine causes and mere 
background conditions (Schaffer 2005, 2014). This sense of causal selection is set in terms of 
distinguishing causes from non-causes. For example, Jonathan Schaffer (2005) asks why a 
spark is selected as “the cause” of a fire, while oxygen is a mere (non-causal) background 
condition. In this paper causal selection is conceived in the former sense.  
Despite significant discrepancies, a common thread binds together much of the 
literature on causal selection. The thread is John Stuart Mill. Waters (2007) uses Mill as a 
foil. Schaffer (2014) takes Mill to offer the “main argument” for the “standard view.” Mill’s 
(1843/1981) discussion of causal selection has a pervasive influence on how philosophers 
think about causal selection. His pessimism and dismissive conclusions about it continue to 
frame the philosophical problem. 
 
2. A Brief History of Causal Selection 
 
Since John Stuart Mill, causal selection has been rightly associated with variability. 
Mill demonstrates that even when selections follow a fixed rule, there is significant 
variability in how selections are made. A single rule can pick out various types of causes 
across different cases. Sometimes a rule makes sensible selections and other times it selects 
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causes “no one would regard as … principal” (1843/1981, 329). Mill observes that this 
depends on “the purpose we have in view” (ibid.). A rule may select causes useful for some 
purposes, but not others. While his discussion is framed around one rule, Mill says there is no 
reason to suppose “this or any other rule is always adhered to” (ibid.). Many types of causes 
are selected for many different purposes using many different rules. For Mill, this variability 
prompts pessimism. 
The diverse causal and pragmatic details that vary across cases of causal selection 
lead Mill to conclude causal selection is “capricious,” unscientific, and outside the purview 
of philosophical analysis (ibid.). The severity of his conclusions is striking in the context of 
System of Logic where Mill uses a method of refining our often-capricious everyday 
reasoning into more principled “ratiocination.” His method is pragmatic, involving analyzing 
how reasoning and logical “contrivances” are used towards their epistemic purposes 
(1843/1981, 6). Yet, causal selection is uniquely problematic. Mill thinks selections are 
influenced by too many, and too diverse, causal and pragmatic details—details about 
different purposes, rules, and reasons for selecting causes— to be given adequate 
philosophical analysis. 1 
	
1 In Logic, Mill describes other types of everyday reasoning as “capricious”. Within his 
philosophical methodology this is not necessarily problematic. Capriciousness implies that 
philosophy is needed to refine and retool that reasoning to better serve certain epistemic 
ends. It does not imply pessimism or wholesale dismissal. However, Mill thinks the 
capriciousness of causal is uniquely problematic. Mill’s claims, and the problem he 
identifies, are more nuanced and challenging than most philosophers have appreciated 
(Hanley manuscript).  
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Mill resolves his concerns by retreating from causal selection entirely. He proposes 
restricting all causal reasoning to a general notion of universal and invariable causes that 
preclude any need for selection. This pattern of reasoning is not unique to Mill, and enjoys a 
lasting legacy. David Lewis follows a similar pattern, noting the “invidious principles” of 
causal selection before retreating to the “prior question” of a “broad” concept of causation 
(1973, 559). With this endorsement, Mill’s pessimism has “won the field” in many circles 
(Schaffer 2014). Consequently, causal selection and the reasoning behind it are widely 
ignored. However, Lewis himself recognizes that pessimism and retreat are not necessary. In 
a footnote, Lewis says he would be amenable to an account of causal selection like the one 
offered by Morton White (1965). White’s account is similar to the more influential one 
formulated by Hart & Honoré’s (1959). Not all philosophers have agreed with Mill’s 
pessimism. 
 
3. Exceptions to Mill’s Pessimism 
 
Hart & Honoré’s (1959) analysis of causal selection is perhaps the most widely 
known challenge to Mill. Their approach represents a typical way philosophers break from 
the Millian pattern of pessimism and retreat. Noting that causal selection is “inseparable 
feature” of causal reasoning in law, their area of interest, they are compelled to challenge 
Mill’s view (1959, 11). Like Mill, they acknowledge the variability of selections. However, 
they contend that Mill misidentifies the source of it. They argue that only variable causal 
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details are relevant for analyzing how selections are made, not diverse pragmatic details 
(Hart & Honoré 1959, 17). By pushing to the background those variable purposes, rules, and 
reasons for selecting causes, they think analysis is possible.  
Hart & Honoré develop a general rule for selecting abnormal causes, causes 
deviating from normal circumstances. Mill thinks such a rule is inadequate because many 
different rules are used to select causes for diverse purposes. To avoid this problem, Hart & 
Honoré argue that variability across selections is not due to these pragmatic details. Instead it 
is entirely due to how the same rule is applied to structurally different cases.  
For example, in a factory where the presence of oxygen is normal, an abnormal spark 
is the important cause of a fire. In a factory where sparks are normal, the abnormal presence 
of oxygen is the important cause of a fire (1959, 10). Important causes vary, but that variance 
is entirely due to “a subordinate aspect of a more general principle” as it is applied to cases 
with varying causal structures (1959, 17). They think causal details matter, but pragmatic 
details do not.  
This approach offers a way to dissolve the source of Mill’s pessimism. However, it 
relies on a crucial assumption. Hart & Honoré claim causal selection is unique to the law. 
They claim that other areas, including all sciences, have only a “derivative interest” in it 
(1959, 9). This circumscription is what justifies subordinating all the variability of selections 
to different applications of their single rule, which warrants disregarding the diverse 
pragmatic details Mill identifies. Only by narrowing causal selection to the law can they 
construe their rule as a general analysis and a solution to Mill’s problem. If causal selection 
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is not unique to law, then their approach is a tenuous response to Mill founded primarily on 
neglecting the diverse pragmatics that are at work in causal selection. 
Contra Hart & Honoré, causal selection is not unique to one discipline. It runs 
through important reasoning in science, engineering, and other areas of thought. Several 
philosophers have noted its significant role in explanation and investigation in biology and 
related sciences (Gannett 1999; Waters 2007; Woodward 2010; Stegmann 2014, Franklin-
Hall 2014, Forthcoming; Weber 2017; Baxter 2019; Ross forthcoming). While this 
undermines a key premise in Hart & Honoré’s approach, many of these philosophers of 
biology follow similar ones. Many have strong preferences for “ontological” analyses 
(Waters 2007; Stegmann 2014; Weber 2017), analyses in terms of a single general rule 
(Waters 2007, Franklin-Hall forthcoming), or analyses that minimize the role of pragmatics 
(Franklin-Hall 2014).  
Apparent exceptions to Mill’s pessimism confirm a key aspect of his concern. The 
diverse pragmatic details of causal selection pose problems for philosophical analysis. Mill 
almost certainly would deny Hart & Honoré’s approach addresses his problem. In fact, he 
rejects a very similar notion to their abnormal causes (1843/1981, 328). Mill thinks diverse 
pragmatics are inseparable from how causal selection works. Formulating a general rule that 
minimizes or ignores them is not a solution. It leads to deficient accounts that leave out much 
of the reasoning behind selection. If Mill is correct, then the problem is how to meaningfully 
analyze the pragmatic details of selections. But is he? There are good reasons to think so. 
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4. Analyzing Pragmatics 
 
Several philosophers have acknowledged that pragmatics matter for analyzing causal 
selection (Gannett 1999; Waters 2006; Kronfelder 2014; Woodward 2014). While Waters 
(2007) offers a general rule for selecting important causes, Waters (2006) embraces 
pragmatic details (e.g. the purposes, strategies, and activities of biologists) to argue genetic 
causes are important because they are useful for manipulating biological processes. However, 
the most compelling evidence that pragmatics matter is the striking diversity among accounts 
of causal selection.  
Hart & Honoré’s concern with assigning liability, Sober’s (1988) focus on 
apportioning causal contributions, Franklin-Hall’s (2014) interest in how much causal 
information is needed to explain, and Collingwood’s (1957) focus on manipulation each lead 
to remarkably different analyses of why some causes are selected as important. Each 
emphasizes what Mill would consider distinct purposes for selecting causes. If different 
purposes require different types of selections, and consequently require different analyses, 
then the variability among philosophical accounts implies pragmatics do matter. 
I argue that Mill was right that pragmatic details matter for how causal selection 
works. However, I show that analyzing them is possible. My approach is similar to van 
Fraassen’s (2008) way of analyzing the role of pragmatics in representation. Van Fraassen 
acknowledges the “variable polyadicity” of representation, and embraces diverse pragmatic 
details about use, purposes, practices, and context in his analysis (2008, 29). Similarly, 
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analyzing causal selection in terms of the different purposes it can serve, and the various 
ways selections are actually used to achieve these purposes, across varying contexts, can 
elucidate causal reasoning about important causes. My approach can be contrasted with other 
pragmatic approaches, such as Collingwood’s account of causal selection in terms of what a 
particular human has an ability to prevent (1957, 302-304). This is a comparatively narrow 
sense of “pragmatic” than the one I demonstrate in what follows. My approach is more akin 
to the research program articulated by James Woodward in his PSA Presidential Address. It 
shows how to analyze causal reasoning in terms of the details about “various goals and 
purposes” and how causal concepts and causal knowledge “conduce” to their achievement 
(Woodward 2014, 693). 
To argue my case, I analyze a dispute among safety scientists concerning the causes 
of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy. Stripped of pragmatics, the dispute appears to involve an 
intractable disagreement over preferences for different methods, the resolution of which 
looks more like a question for sociologists than philosophers. However, when pragmatic 
details such as the purposes guiding the selection of important causes of disasters and the 
actual uses of causal knowledge are considered, the disagreement is clearly principled and 






5. Causal Selection in the Bhopal Gas Tragedy  
 
In 1984, a deadly disaster occurred in Bhopal, India. This disaster resulted from the 
release of toxic chemical from a processing plant. The chemical spread through surrounding 
populated areas, killing thousands, and permanently injuring hundreds of thousands more. 
The Bhopal Gas Tragedy continues to affect local populations today. 
Many causal factors brought about this disaster, but investigators focused on a human 
error. During routine cleaning a worker failed to insert a device designed to prevent water 
from entering chemical tanks in case of valve failures. This error caused water to leak 
through the valve during cleaning, pouring into a chemical tank containing a large volume of 
methyl isocyanate. The mixing of water and methyl isocyanate created a chemical reaction 
with enough energy to vent tons of the toxic chemical into the air.  
This account fits the traditional method for modeling disasters used by safety 
scientists. Typically, as in the findings of the investigators, disasters are modeled as chains of 
causal events. Causal chain models2 like these were developed at the dawn of scientific 
studies of accidents and safety (Heinrich 1959). Experts rely on these models to understand 
accident causality across a range of sociotechnical systems including the plant at Bhopal. The 
method models disasters using chains of proximate causes, discrete causal events arising 
	
2 Safety experts sometimes refer to this class of accident models as “linear causal models.” 
However, as an anonymous reviewer notes, this term has a narrower technical meaning in 
causal modeling literature. For clarity, I refer to the models used by safety experts as causal 
chain models. 
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from relations among human agents and physical technologies within a system that occur 
spatially and temporally close to an accident. Examples include human errors, component 
failures, and energy-related events. The chain of proximate causes involved in the Bhopal 
disaster is the failure to insert the safety device, the resulting valve leak, and the chemical 
reaction. Had these causes not occurred, or occurred differently, then the disaster would have 
been less likely to occur if at all. 
Recently, some safety scientists have argued against this methodological orthodoxy. 
Citing changes in complexities of systems since the beginning of safety science in the early 
20th Century, they argue that causal chain models have outlived their usefulness: these 
models are no longer adequate for understanding and learning from disasters like the one at 
the chemical plant in Bhopal. At the heart of their dissent is what they see as an incorrect 
emphasis on proximate causes, which they contend mislead scientists and engineers. Causal 
models that emphasize more important causes should be developed and replace the 
widespread use of chain models. Proximate causes are genuine causes, but they are not the 
most important causes of disasters. 
Nancy Leveson is a leading voice against the effectiveness of causal chain models. 
She argues that the traditional focus on these models should be replaced by an emphasis on 
systemic causes.3 Systemic causes of disasters are distinct from their proximate causes. 
	
3 Conceptual issues involving systemic causes and complex sociotechnical systems merit 
further philosophical attention (Noy et. al. 2015). The concept of a systemic causes can be 
given fuller analysis, but for this paper they can be conceived in the rough way safety 
scientists discuss them: as causal properties of a system distinct from proximate causes.  
	 12	
Systemic causes are properties of a system that causally influence its behavior. They are 
associated with the overall design and organization of a system. In the case of Bhopal, there 
were many systemic causes of the disaster (Leveson 2012). One systemic cause was the 
operating conditions at the plant. Before the disaster, many safety devices were disabled to 
save money; early-warning alarms and refrigerated chemical tanks among them. Poor 
operating conditions like these allowed the chemical reaction to occur at the strength it did 
while leaving the reaction undetected. Had operating conditions been different—had they 
been better—the disaster would have been much less likely to occur.  
Leveson identifies a number of other systemic causes involved in the Bhopal disaster. 
A systems approach reveals design deficiencies also caused the disaster. Devices designed to 
minimize chemical releases were designed for smaller, less powerful events than the one at 
Bhopal. Vent scrubbers and flare towers that neutralize vented chemicals were designed for 
much smaller amounts of chemicals than was released during the disaster. Water curtains 
designed to minimize released chemical only reached heights well below where venting 
actually occurred. The only devices able to reach that height were inefficient individually 
operated water jets. Safety culture at the plant was also very poor. Safety audits prior to the 
disaster were ignored. Alarms sounded erroneously during normal operations, making 
genuine alarms impossible to discern. Employees had sparse safety training and safety 
equipment, and there were few qualified engineers at the plant. Had these design deficiencies 
and poor safety culture been remedied, the disaster would have been much less likely to 
occur. 
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Disasters in complex sociotechnical systems like in Bhopal are caused by systemic 
and proximate causes together. Poor safety culture, operating conditions, and design 
deficiencies as well as the maintenance error and leaky valve were all causes of the disaster. 
Since systemic and proximate causes are distinct causes of disasters, disagreements about 
whether proximate causal chain models or systems-based models identify more important 
causes are disagreements about causal selection, much as Mill defined it. One sense of the 
term “invidious” that Lewis (1973) uses to describe causal selection correctly applies here. 
Selection of the most important causes of the Bhopal disaster arouses discontent, resentment, 
or animosity.  
To this day, corporate owners of the plant have largely avoided or denied 
responsibility. Contentious disputes among activists, the Indian government, and corporate 
entities endure over reparations and deficient cleanup. Legal battles continue steadily since 
1984, with court hearings as recent as 2012. Serious questions of ethics are tightly 
interwoven with questions of what was the most important cause of the disaster. So too are 
methodological questions about how best to prevent such terrible tragedies from ever 
happening again. 
The Bhopal disaster plays a motivating role in safety science and engineering. The 
tragedy demonstrates how critical it is for engineers to practice the best methods and 
reasoning practices available. Given the stakes, decisions over which causes are the most 
important for understanding and preventing disasters has aroused debate. However, while 
Lewis implies that all this invidiousness is reason for philosophers to retreat to generalities, 
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the ethical and methodological significance of causal selection in cases such as the Bhopal 
disaster imply the opposite.  
The material weight of how debates about causal selection are adjudicated gives 
philosophers undeniable reasons to take them seriously. It also gives reason to worry that 
dismissing or retreating from these debates may be deleterious. Bad actors interested in 
avoiding responsibility surely would agree with Mill’s notion that “we have, philosophy 
speaking, no right” to make selections of important causes (1843/1981, 328). Cases like the 
Bhopal gas tragedy show that philosophers have, philosophically speaking, a duty to engage 
with causal selection deeply, not dismissively. But how can philosophers analyze 
disagreements about important causes, such as the methodological one in safety science? 
On one side of the disagreement is a traditional method that emphasizes proximate 
causes. It is hard to deny that human errors and component failures are important causes of 
accidents in some sense. On the other side, dissenting safety experts argue against this 
traditional way of modeling accidents. They contend that the most important causes of 
disasters in complex systems are systemic ones, and the proximate causal chain models that 
exclude them are unsatisfactory. Systems-based approaches should be pursued instead. 
Again, it is hard to deny that issues with safety culture and design deficiencies were 
important causes of the Bhopal disaster. 
Is one position more justified than the other? This question relates to another sense of 
the term “invidious” as unfairly discriminating, or unjust. This is the sense most assume 
Lewis intended. At this point it is not obvious what a philosopher can say about which side is 
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justified. Philosophers could analyze the causes themselves and their relations to accidents 
and to other causal factors. But this alone would not adjudicate the disagreement about which 
are more important or elucidate any reasons why. One could take the Millian approach and 
conclude that all a philosopher should say is, strictly speaking, all the factors taken together 
were the real cause. On this view, beyond that, the disagreement appears to be simply an 
expression of competing preferences. Engineers in supervisory or maintenance roles prefer 
thinking about human errors, while engineers who manage or design systems prefer systemic 
factors. What can philosophers say about preferences that would bear on causality?  
The situation is reminiscent of Carnap’s (1966/1995) discussion of how different 
professionals would select different causes to explain a car crash.4 Carnap attributes those 
differences to divergent preferences determined by professional interests. He promptly ends 
his analysis there and appeals to a general notion of “cause” nearly identical to Mill’s. This 
abrupt end implies Carnap thinks there is nothing philosophical left to say about 
disagreements about important causes. Road engineers prefer causes related to their interest 
in roads, police prefer causes related to an interest in policing, but preferences like these are 
	
4 An anonymous reviewer correctly points out that this example is first found in Collingwood 
(1957). Unlike Carnap, Collingwood thinks there is a principle guiding selections of different 
causes of a crash. He explains different selection in terms of what the selector is “able to 
produce or prevent” (1957, 302-304). Like Carnap, the analysis of selection does not go 
deeper. As the next sections shows, there is more to the pragmatics of selecting important 
causes for preventing accidents than Collingwood’s notion of selecting what a person can 
“put right.” 
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not philosophically interesting. How can a philosopher of causation give a deeper analysis to 
preferences? 
 
6. Pragmatics of Leveson’s Reasoning 
 
There is more to the disagreement about the Bhopal disaster than competing 
preferences. This becomes clear when Leveson’s (2012) reasoning is analyzed in terms of 
pragmatics. Leveson’s reasons for selecting systemic causes over proximate ones relate to the 
purposes safety scientists have when evaluating the causes of disasters and to how they 
actually use causal knowledge to achieve these purposes. Analyzing Leveson’s causal 
reasoning in terms of these pragmatics reveals that the disagreement over the relative 
importance of systemic and proximate causes is principled. Principles about which types of 
causes are more important than others for certain purposes. 
Nancy Leveson argues that proximate causes are “misleading at best” (2012, 28). To 
narrowly focus on them leads to “ignoring some of the most important factors in terms of 
preventing future accidents” (2012, 33). In large, complex systems of humans and 
technology, proximate causes are less important causes for preventing certain types of 
behavior. From a pragmatic perspective, there is a principled rationale behind claims about 
the relative importance of systemic causes over proximate causes.  
As Leveson explains, proximate causes of disasters are unlikely events. The 
probability of a human error occurring in the way that it did at the plant in Bhopal is quite 
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low. Given the complexity of the system it occurred within, anticipating when it would occur 
would be near impossible.  Furthermore, directly preventing proximate causes such as human 
errors is notoriously difficult (Reason 1990). Finally, whether a maintenance error leads to 
disaster is contingent on an unlikely confluence of many other factors. Proximate causes are 
unlikely, difficult to predict, problematic points of interventions, that are only weakly related 
to disasters. Because of these features, focus on them implies disasters like the Bhopal Gas 
Tragedy are unpredictable and unavoidable events. 
Leveson and other safety experts argue disasters, including the one in Bhopal, can 
often be predicted and prevented. Given the poor state of safety culture, operating conditions, 
etc. at the chemical processing plant, imminent disaster was likely and knowable. Had 
engineers intervened on these systemic factors, then disaster would have been less likely. 
Yet, this perspective is obscured by focus on proximate causes.  
The possibility to predict and prevent disasters in complex sociotechnical systems 
requires causes that conduce to these goals. Safety experts who argue for the importance of 
systemic causes are not basing this on their preferred methods, or what they happen to be 
able to control. Their argument is that systemic causes are more important because 
knowledge of these causes offers distinct epistemic and technical advantages over other 
causes for the purpose of preventing disasters such as the Bhopal Gas Tragedy.  
Stopping where Carnap concluded his analysis of the car accident would render the 
disagreement among safety experts philosophically intractable. Digging into pragmatic 
details here has revealed important lines of reasoning behind claims like the ones made by 
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Leveson. In turn, it raises further questions amenable to philosophical analysis. Philosophers 
can ask, what properties do systemic causes have that make them useful for prediction and 
prevention? What do proximate causes lack that makes them less important for these 
purposes?  
 
7. Philosophical Analysis of Pragmatic Details 
 
To begin analyzing the importance of systemic causes in the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, the 
proximate and systemic causes of the disaster can be framed in the same causal theory. To do 
this I use James Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation (2003). Roughly speaking, 
according to Woodward’s account, causal relations hold between two variables when a 
change in the value of one variable would bring about a subsequent change in the value of 
the other (or an increase or decrease in the probability of a change in value of the second 
variable). Woodward conceives this relation in terms of hypothetical changes and 
counterfactual dependence relations. There are many technical aspects to his account, but it is 
not necessary to draw upon them here.  
Recall, proximate causes are discrete causal events arising from relations among 
human agents and physical technologies within a system. At the plant in Bhopal, the human 
error causing the disaster was an employee failing to insert a physical safety device. This 
caused the subsequent component failure of water leaking through a valve. These proximate 
factors caused the release of chemical from the plant. Safety experts represent this kind of 
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causal process as a chain of proximate causal variables, as discussed in section 5. Each node 
of a causal chain model can be given a straightforward interpretation as interventionist causal 
variables, as represented in Figure 1.			
 
 
Figure 1. The release of chemicals, represented by E, depended on a component failure, CF, 
and a human error, HE. The values these variables take on are associated with the occurrence 
of the respective associated behavior in the system.  
 
Human errors and component failures are understood as events, but they can be 
formulated as binary variables in the interventionist framework. For example, the variable 
HE in Figure 1, representing a particular human error can take on two values: a human error 
occurring, or not. The variable CF, representing a particular component failure also takes on 
two different values: a component failure occurs, or not. The arrows connecting each variable 
represent a causal relationship, defined by the following dependence relations. Changes in 
the value of HE have counterfactual or actual control over the probability of a change in the 
value of CF. Changes in the value of CF in turn have counterfactual or actual control over 
the probability of a change in the value of the target effect variable E. There are a number of 
different ways to conceive of the target effect variable when representing the Bhopal disaster, 
or any complex causal process. For the purpose of this analysis, it is easiest to formulate the 
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variable as safety experts do in causal chain models, as a binary accident variable. In this 
case, the variable, E, can take on two different values: chemical is released, or not.  
Systemic factors, such as safety culture and operating conditions, also stand in an 
interventionist causal relation with accidents and disasters. Actual or hypothetical 
interventions on systemic properties do or could bring about subsequent changes to the 
behavior of the system and the likelihood of certain types of effects. The possibility of 
systems engineering and systems-based approaches to safety, such as Leveson’s, depend on 
systemic factors having this kind of causal control over system behavior. Figure 2 offers one 




Figure 2. Systemic variables have causal control over the release of chemicals. Changes in 
the value of S are associated with the probability distribution of changes to the value of the 
same effect variable, E, as in figure 1.  
 
A systemic causal variable S also stands in a counterfactual dependence relationship 
with the same target effect variable E from Figure 1. Changes to the values of a systemic 
causal variable can be associated with changes made to a systemic property. To make this 
more concrete, in the case of the Bhopal disaster, changes to the value of S can be associated 
with changes to the safety culture at the plant. By changing safety culture, safety experts can 
change the probability of the effect associated with E occurring. Changes in the value of S 
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lead to subsequent changes in the probability of a change in the value of E, i.e. the 
probability of chemical being released or not.  
Interventions on systemic properties are one means of controlling behaviors of 
sociotechnical systems and the likelihood of certain types of events occurring within them. 
While systems-approaches are founded on this possibility, experts can also intervene on 
systems in other ways. Before the development of systems-based approaches, most safety 
practices focused on proximate factors as the primary points of intervention. Safety was 
understood primarily in terms of controlling human errors and component failures. 
Approaches like Leveson’s are an alternative to these traditional approaches based on 
emphasizing different causal factors to use controlling systems. Hence, Figure 1 and Figure 
2 represent different causal relationships emphasized by alternative approaches. 
So far it is still not clear why one of these models is more predictive, or offers better 
interventions for prevention. The two models show that both proximate and systemic causes 
offer causal control over disasters. They do not indicate much else, and do not elucidate why 
systemic interventionist causes may be more important than proximate ones for preventing 
disasters. To understand the causal selection surrounding cases such as the Bhopal disaster, 
analysis of these causal relationships needs to go deeper. More nuanced causal concepts like 
Woodward’s notion of causal stability, and a new concept I begin to develop here, fill out a 
richer philosophical analysis. When considered together with the pragmatics of selection they 
give a principled account of why systemic causes are more important causes than proximate 
causes in complex sociotechnical systems.  
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In complex systems like the one in the Bhopal disaster, no proximate or systemic 
causes invariably causes accidents. For example, human errors or component failures in 
sociotechnical systems, such as the ones that occurred in the plant at Bhopal, do not always 
lead to accidents. A wide range of other circumstances must have obtained in order for them 
to have actually brought about their effects. Consequently, proximate causes like those in 
Figure 1 must be understood as causes strictly in relation to a background of other causal 
factors within which they cause their effects. The same goes for most causes involved in 
disasters, including systemic causes, and most causes of anything represented in Woodward’s 
interventionist framework. Interventionist causes almost always require some range in the 
values of other causal variables to obtain in order to bring about their effect.  
For Woodward, unlike Mill, this is not problematic. Causes need not be invariable, 
but can come in degrees of invariance. For example, consider the causal relationship between 
the temperature of water and the effect of changes to phase state. The relation holds within 
certain ranges of temperature changes. The relation also only holds within particular ranges 
of values in other variables, e.g. ambient pressure. The variables of temperature and pressure, 
among others, create a multi-dimensional space. Within that space, there are regions within 
which changes to temperature brings about changes to the effect. This region in the multi-
dimensional space under which the relation holds is the invariance space of the cause. 
Woodward sometimes refers to this concept as the ‘background conditions’ of a cause 
(2010). I choose not to use this term because the term conditions can suggest that the 
background is not causal. While some parts of a background are not causally relevant, much 
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of it is in Woodward’s account. The causally relevant background is what I refer to when 
using the term invariance space. All the causal relations represented in Figure 1 and Figure 
2 should be conceived as holding only within some invariance space of other causal factors.  
The size of invariance spaces varies for different causal relations. In other words, 
some interventionist causes hold under larger invariance spaces than others. In Woodward’s 
framework, the relative sizes of invariance spaces for different causal relations can be 
analyzed and compared using the concept he calls, causal stability (Woodward 2010). 
Minimally stable causes hold under small regions. Maximally stable causes hold across wider 
ranges of circumstances. Causes are more or less stable depending on the relative sizes of 
their respective invariance spaces. This kind of conceptual tool that distinguishes causes in 
terms of the features they possess, and to what degree, are essential for analyzing causal 
selection.  
While Woodward develops the concept of causal stability for analyzing explanations 
of biological phenomena, the concept can also help elucidate causal selection that is aimed at 
preventing, rather than explaining. The causes of the Bhopal disaster with the most stability 
are systemic causes. The proximate causes hold only under highly specific circumstances. As 
I explain below, systemic causes hold across a wide range of different circumstances. Hence, 
the concept of stability offers a clear basis for analyzing why some causes are more useful for 
the purposes of predicting and preventing accidents than other causes. 
Recall, a key consideration in Leveson’s claims about the importance of systemic 
causes is that proximate causes make the Bhopal disaster appear contingent and 
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unpredictable. On the other hand, she argues systemic causes make it clear that a disaster was 
bound to happen. For these reasons, Leveson thinks systemic causes are more important for 
the purpose of predicting disasters. Another key consideration in her reasoning was that 
systemic causes offer more important means of intervening on a system to prevent disasters, 
while proximate causes such as human errors are less effective means. These pragmatic 
considerations can be analyzed in terms of differences in causal stability, and used to give a 
principled analysis to the selection of systemic causes as more important for achieving these 
epistemic and technical aims. 
Had the causal circumstances surrounding the maintenance error and leaky valve 
been even slightly different at the plant in Bhopal, then they likely would have had much 
different effects. For example, had the maintenance error occurred elsewhere in the plant, or 
at different time during its operation, then it would not have had the kind of disastrous effects 
safety experts are interested in preventing. Had the plant been organized and operating more 
safely, then these variables would no longer bear a causal relationship to disaster. The 
variables represented in figure 1 stand in a causal relationship under a relatively small 
invariance space compared to systemic variables, as I show next. Proximate causes are 
weakly stable causes. 
Systemic causes increase the probability of a disaster in a system like the one in 
Bhopal across many different circumstances. For example, the poor safety culture could have 
caused a disaster at the plant under many different possible proximate causal events. Had the 
maintenance error occurred differently or not at all, the probability of disaster would have 
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remained high because of the state of the systemic factors. Changes to these systemic factors 
would have lowered the probability of a disaster under the actual circumstances and many 
others. Excellent safety culture lowers the probability of disaster across many different 
proximate causal events. In sum, changes to value of systemic causal variables in Figure 2 
control the probability distribution of an effect variable under a large invariance space. 
Systemic causes of disasters have strong causal stability. 
Relative differences in stability give systemic causes and proximate causes different 
epistemic and technical functions. Causes with less stability are useful for predicting effects 
in narrow sets of changes to a system. In contrast, more stable causes predict their effect 
across a larger set of changes a system does or may exhibit, even for changes that are 
difficult to predict or observe. Highly stable systemic causes offer an epistemic advantage for 
safety experts to achieve their goal of assessing the risk of disastrous effects in large, 
complex systems that exhibit many unpredictable changes over time.  
Causes with increased stability offer interventions on a system more conducive to the 
task of preventing disasters. Systemic causes can suppress their effects under many 
perturbations to a system. This kind of control is advantageous when the effects are disasters. 
Towards the technical ends of safety experts, systemic factors have an additional causal 
feature offering complementary advantages. The feature can be further analyzed by looking 
closer at the interrelations of proximate and systemic causes.  
There are at least two ways proximate and systemic causes might relate in systems 
like the Bhopal disaster. Figure 3 represents one way they are related. Systemic factors can 
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have control over the values of many different possible proximate causes of an accident 
effect. For example, improved safety culture at the plant in Bhopal would lower the 
probability of the maintenance error. It also would lower the probability of a number of other 
possible human errors. This models one aspect of Leveson’s reasoning where she points out 
that even if the exact maintenance error had not occurred in Bhopal, given the systemic 
causes involved, some other human error was likely to cause a disaster anyway. By 
controlling a systemic cause, engineers can decrease the probability of many different human 
errors occurring, and consequently decrease the likelihood of an accident (see Figure 3). 
This feature explains why systemic causes are important for the purpose of preventing 
disasters. 
 
Figure 3. One way systemic and proximate causes relate is through a systemic variable 
having control over the probability of many different proximate causal chains leading to the 
effect. 
 
In addition to having control over the value of proximate causes, there is reason to 
think systemic causes bear a second kind of causal relationship with the probability of 
accidents and disasters. Some safety scientists think human errors and component failures are 
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inevitable in complex systems (Reason 1990, 409). If proximate causes are inevitable, then 
systemic causes do not have complete control over their occurrence or the values they take 
on. Nevertheless, these safety experts think systemic causes offer causal control needed to 
prevent accidents and disasters. Consequently, systemic causes do not just relate to proximate 
causes by controlling changes to their values (as represented in Figure 3). Furthermore, the 
causal relation between systemic variables and their effects (Figure 2) is not necessarily a 
mere abstraction of intermediate control of proximate causes (Figure 3). The 
interrelationships of systemic and proximate causes, and their effects, are more complicated. 
To this point, I propose systemic causes exhibit an interesting causal feature that has not been 
analyzed in terms of Woodward’s interventionist framework.  
Some changes to systemic factors, such as when safety culture is improved, weaken 
the stability of proximate causes. On the other hand, when the systemic factor is changed in 
another way, such as when safety culture is worsened, then the stability of proximate causes 
is strengthened. Systemic causes have control over the strength of other causal relations. For 
example, human errors cause disasters under a wider range of circumstances when systemic 
factors are at a certain value (e.g. when safety culture is poor). When those systemic factors 
are changed (e.g. when safety culture is improved), then the same proximate factors cause 
disasters under a smaller range of circumstances. Systemic factors bear a damping and 
amplifying relation, a relation not to their effects, but to the strength of other causal 
relationships around them, i.e. other causal relations in their invariance space. I represent this 
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relationship in Figure 4 with the wavy line, and in Figure 5 in the standard framework for 
directed acyclic graph. 
	  
Figures 4a, 4b. The wavy line represents another way systemic and proximate causes 
interrelate. This amplifying/damping relation holds when changes in a variable influence the 
strength of other causal relations, rather than the values the variables take on. The wavy line 
is not a part of standard method of constructing directed acyclic graphs. 
 
 
Figures 5a, 5b. Amplifying/damping relation can be represented as collider structures in a 
standard framework for directed acyclic graphs. In this simplified form, this structure does 
not evoke the distinctive nature of the amplifying/damping relation systemic causes bear on 
proximate causes. 
 
This relation is not a relation of cause and effect, but is nevertheless causal in nature. 
It can be understood similar to a moderating variable as discussed in the context of some 
social sciences.5 Suppose occurrences of human errors can be reduced, but not eliminated. If 	
5 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this similarity, and for suggesting the form 
of representation in Figure 5. Amplifying/damping causes may be a type of moderating 
cause in the sense discussed by Kincaid (2012, 59-60), but here they have a narrower sense 
set in terms of Woodward’s concepts of stability and invariance space. I agree with Kincaid 
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so, then changes in systemic factors do not produce changes in the values of these 
ineliminable human errors (as in Figure 3). Put in more interventionist language, if particular 
proximate causes are inevitable, then changes to systemic variables do not have control over 
the values that these proximate causes take on. Systemic factors are not interventionist causes 
of ineliminable proximate causes. Nevertheless, changes in systemic factors do influence 
whether these proximate causes can actually bring about accidents and disasters. One way 
they do this is through altering the background circumstances a proximate cause continues to 
bring about its effects. Changes to some systemic factors can increase or decrease the range 
of circumstances where the occurrence of a human error stands in a causal relation with 
disasters. Hence, changes to this type of systemic factor appear to change the size of the 
invariance space of some proximate causes. In other words, some systemic causes can 
influence the stability of other causes. I call this relationship amplifying/damping. 
This causal feature further fills out the analysis of why systemic causes are important 
for preventing disasters by showing again how they are more useful means of preventing 
certain types of effects from coming about in complex systems. This causal concept also 
offers a way to enrich Woodward’s framework further, raising an underexplored aspect of 
causality. More detailed exploration and analysis can be pursued beyond this preliminary 
presentation. However, this should point to the importance of digging deeper in details, rather 
than retreating to generalities or ending analysis when pragmatics arise.  
	
that there are limitations representing moderating causes with acyclic graphs, hence I offer 
the non-standard representation in Figure 4.  
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The disagreement surrounding Bhopal is over what the most important causes are for 
the purpose of predicting and preventing disasters. All agree what the causes are, but disagree 
which are most important. Stripped of pragmatic considerations, it was unclear how to 
analyze the disagreement. Once these details were considered, analysis could continue to 
show why more stable systemic causes that control many proximate causes, and 
amplify/dampen others, are better predictors and means of intervening for preventing 
disasters in complex sociotechnical systems. As Mill thought, the pragmatic details of 
Leveson’s reasoning matter for understanding how selections are made. However, he was 
wrong to think that this precludes philosophical analysis. As this section shows, analysis can 
go deeper. When embraced, the kind of multifarious pragmatic details of causal selection that 
worried Mill actually provide a basis for deeper analysis. 
 
8. The Philosophical Importance of Pragmatic Details 
 
The history of philosophical interest in causal selection is largely defined by 
skepticism about the pragmatics this reasoning involves. The literature tends to follow the 
general tenet that causal details—types of causes and their features, properties, structures, 
interrelationships, etc.—are important for analysis, but pragmatic details—different 
purposes, rules, reasons, activities involved in how people reason about and use causes—can 
and should be avoided. Many consider these details to be “mere pragmatics” and their 
inclusion assumed to give less rigorous analyses, or anything goes. Philosophers who 
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acknowledge some role for pragmatics mostly do so narrowly, trying to minimize their 
significance. However, the Bhopal case study implies pragmatic details are crucial for 
analyzing causal reasoning about important causes. 
Some readers might nevertheless still question the significance of pragmatics in my 
analysis. They might claim the philosophically interesting aspects of this case of causal 
selection are exhausted by purely causal concepts. They might argue that the world contains 
more or less important causal features, stability among the important ones. They could accept 
the idea that considering pragmatics helps uncover these important features, but argue that 
whether a cause has those features does not depend on whether humans are interested in 
using them for their purposes. They could conclude that pragmatics offer a window into 
interesting aspects of causality, but specific details about our purposes can ultimately be 
disregarded in favor of general concepts about objectively important causal details. I close by 
showing the adverse philosophical and social consequences of this view, and how they are 
resolved by embracing pragmatics in their rich detail. 
Recall, Hart & Honoré ignore the diverse pragmatic details that worried Mill by 
circumscribing causal selection to a problem unique to history and law. For Mill, the 
consequences of this approach are part of why causal selection is philosophically 
problematic. Construing a single principle as a general solution, Mill says, results in a lot of 
faulty causal reasoning. The Bhopal case study confirms the adverse epistemic consequence 
of disregarding pragmatic details in favor of generality. The case also shows potentially 
pernicious social consequences of ignoring Mill’s warnings.  
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Hart & Honoré’s abnormalism principle selects the maintenance error as the 
important cause of the Bhopal disaster, since it deviates from normal circumstances and is 
associated with a human act. Their principle deems systemic causes quite unimportant, since 
they are remote, mostly fixed aspects of the causal process. Section 7 shows this is an 
ineffective selection for preventing disasters. However, even for questions about liability that 
Hart & Honoré develop their account to answer, their selection is dubious.  
Assigning legal or ethical responsibility to a mistake made by a poorly trained, and 
weakly managed worker is contentious. Even more so is minimizing responsibility for the 
systemic deficiencies of the plant. Maintaining that this analysis is endorsed by the general 
solution to this kind of question is more problematic still, easily bolstering denials of 
culpability by corporate actors involved in the tragedy and working against activists seeking 
justice and reparations for the suffering it created. These controversial results needlessly arise 
from ignoring pragmatics.   
The Bhopal Gas Tragedy involves complex causal details, and pragmatic details. 
Considering them in their rich complexities allows philosophers to ask and answer more 
precise questions about the case. For assigning liability, philosophers can ask whether 
responsibility should be afforded to those with better control over preventing disasters, or 
those with less control? Causal and pragmatic details taken together provide more nuanced 
answers. While section 7 has an epistemological focus, the analysis could be expanded to 
give principled answer to legal and ethical questions. If liability ought to be afforded to 
agents most capable of preventing tragic disasters, and systemic causes are most important 
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for preventing them, then those closely associated with systemic causes should be held most 
responsible. This gives a principled basis for assigning greater responsibility to the corporate 
actors who controlled the systemic causes, than to workers associated with proximate causes 
less important for prevention. Embracing causal and pragmatic aspects of causal selection in 
their fuller detail clarifies reasoning about these cases, and helps philosophers and society 
avoid many needless, and potentially harmful, confusions.  
While Hart & Honoré’s account is not useful for analyzing which causes are 
important for preventing the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, or determining liability in the case, their 
analysis is based on cases where it makes effective selections. Readers might correctly note 
the analysis in section 7 has similar limitations. The analysis of why systemic causes are 
important in the Bhopal case study does not necessarily provide a general analysis that 
applies across all kinds of systems or purposes.  
In simpler systems than the one in Bhopal, systemic causes may be less important 
than proximate causes for prediction and prevention. Proximate causes also figure 
prominently in methods of “root-cause analysis” used to reconstruct how accidents occur. 
For engineers, such contexts where proximate causes are important can undermine the need 
for the methodological changes Leveson proposes. For philosophers, cases where proximate 
causes are important may appear to generate a contradiction, or reintroduce the specter of 
caprice. However, in a robustly pragmatic perspective apparent contradictions and caprice 
are illusory and ripe sources of insight.  
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Safety scientists use causal knowledge to assess the risk of certain behaviors and 
identify effective interventions to prevent them. For complex sociotechnical systems, they do 
so with limited means of making interventions, and with limited knowledge of the types of 
behaviors a complex sociotechnical system will exhibit over time. Given their purposes, and 
the epistemic and technical methods and constraints they have for achieving them, the 
stability and amplifying/damping of systemic causes make them important tools. However, 
for different purposes and practices, it makes sense why proximate causes may be more 
useful tools.  
In early stages of investigation, root-cause analyses are the principal method safety 
experts use to piece together what happened. They consist of ways to trace sequences of 
proximate causes backwards from an accident. Because accidents are complex, difficult to 
observe, and often destroy physical evidence of their causes, chains of proximate causes 
occurring close to an accident are important causes in such investigatory practice. 
Knowledge of proximate causes that have or are most likely to occur within a system are also 
important for inferring time-sensitive decisions about how to prioritize interventions. The 
importance of proximate causes for these practices does not contradict the analysis their 
unimportance for prevention in systems like in the Bhopal Gas Tragedy. Rather, it is further 
evidence of the value of analyzing causal selection in terms of the diverse pragmatics guiding 
it. 
Causes are important for some purposes, and not for others. This depends on how the 
causal details of a case—the types of causes present, what features they have, their 
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interrelations, etc.—relate to details about the types of activities (epistemic, technical, etc.) 
used to pursue certain purposes. Keeping these pragmatic details in the forefront of analysis 
transforms apparent contradictions and caprice into revealing contrasts for philosophers to 
examine. Contrasting how and why causes with certain features are useful for different 
purposes, and how this changes across different types of systems, offer insights for 
developing a richer picture of how causal selection works. Pragmatics illuminate how causal 
reasoning adapts to different circumstances. Ignoring pragmatics obscures this.  
Finally, a reader might challenge the analysis in section 7 with the following kind of 
counterexample. They might argue that if increased causal stability is why causes are 
important for preventing disasters, then there is a more important cause than systemic causes. 
The cause with maximally stable control over the Bhopal Gas Tragedy is the existence of the 
plant in Bhopal. Intervening on its existence prevents disasters across the widest range of 
possible circumstance. Within some approaches to philosophy of causation, a philosopher 
might claims this is a trivial consideration, and is as a counterexample along the lines of a 
“problem of profligate causes” (Menzies 2004). They might claim endorsing the existence of 
the plant as an important cause is an absurdity similar to endorsing the Queen’s failure to 
water my plants as causally relevant to its death, and contend this forms a reductio ad 
absurdum to the analysis in section 7. However, accepting this requires unjustifiable 
oversimplification. 
Safety experts like Leveson are tasked with developing causal knowledge and 
methods to improve the safety of systems without eliminating them. Outside of these 
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pragmatic constraints, the existence of the plant is far from a trivial causal consideration. The 
Bhopal Gas Tragedy raises a real question of whether the best intervention to prevent horrific 
disasters is to eliminate chemical processing plants. This consideration is not an instance of a 
tried-and-true philosophical counterexample. It is a live option, depending on the details of 
what we choose to achieve and how best to pursue it. Ignoring pragmatic details obscures this 
perspective. It may also inadvertently ally philosophers with those who dismiss as 
meaningless questions about whether some system’s existence is a cause of suffering. 
Analyses of causal selection that are sensitive to diverse pragmatic details makes this clear, 
and enables philosophers to play a more active role in socially important debates.  
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